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Abstract 
In the process of economic integration regional production structures are about to change. Several 
studies analysed already trends of regional specialization in the European Union and attempted to 
figure out determinants of observed changes. In this context, so far date the role of the public 
sector and especially the impact of different fiscal designs as determinants of the change in 
production structures have been left aside. Advantages and shortcomings of decentralized 
government organization have been largely discussed theoretically within the last decades. 
Several empirical studies attempted to examine the impact of decentralization on national 
performance, e.g. economic growth and fiscal stability. This paper aims at linking these two 
subjects and analyzes the empirical relationship between regional specialization and fiscal 
decentralization for a panel of 13 Member States of the European Union, controlling for regional 
and other institutional determinants. The analysis shows that rather autonomous regions tend to 
diverse their production structure in order to insure against adverse supply shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the initial work of Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) there has been a wide interest in the 
optimal division of providing public services between different government levels in 
economic literature and political practice. Especially for countries in transition and 
developing countries the decision for centralizing or decentralizing governmental tasks in 
order to promote economic and social development is an important question. Also in 
developed countries changes in the vertical structure of governments can be observed in the 
last decades (OECD 2002). Although there is evidence for increasing decentralization in a 
majority of OECD countries, a unique pattern to one or the other structure does not seem to 
occur (Stegarescu 2004).  
At the same time increasing integration, particularly the creation of the Single Market in the 
European Union facilitating the movement of labour and capital lead to reflections on 
changing production structures in countries and regions. Here the fear of over-specialised 
regions not able to cope with asymmetric shocks may emerge. But the analysis of direction 
and determinants of regional specialization is still an open debate in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Additionally, the possible role of the public sector in influencing process 
of spatially changing production structures becomes more and more a crucial part in this 
discussion (Baldwin et al. (2003), Brakman et al. (2002), Brülhart und Trionfetti (2004)).  
This paper aims at linking these two topics in asking if the autonomy of a region in deciding 
about revenue and expenditure may influence its level of specialization and thus its potential 
capacity of shock absorption. The analysis is organised as follows: section two summarizes 
recent theoretical and empirical work on decentralization and specialization and offers some 
hypotheses for the empirical analysis in section three. Results are presented in section four 
and the paper ends with a conclusion and prospects for futures research. 
   3
2.  Theoretical and empirical insides 
In the following background theoretical and empirical considerations will be explored in order 
to work out testable hypotheses for the above mentioned research question.  
Before starting to investigate the effects of decentralization on economic performance and 
determinants of specialization, it is important to figure out if the public sector is able to shape 
the production structure. In the theoretical and empirical literature there exist different 
positions. While results of the proponents will be discussed in 2.1, opponents as Davis and 
Weinstein (2002, 2004) and Brakman et al. (2004) point out in their empirical analysis that 
even large temporary shocks as Allied bombing of Japanese and German cities in World War 
II did not have an effect on the growth path of these cities and, more important, it has not 
even changed the urban industrial structure of Japanese cities. The implications for the 
effectiveness of regional policy are far reaching, since following Davies and Weinstein (2004) 
policy makers may not be able to choose between multiple equilibria and select with 
temporary interventions the one which is convenient for long-term regional development. 
However, Allied bombing could not destroy the social and transport infrastructure and the 
specific human capital which may have served as an important basis for reconstruction.
1 In 
the case of the West-German cities the federal government aimed at rebuilding cities to their 
pre-war levels and provided specific grants to cities and private persons in order to stimulate 
re-construction of houses and buildings (Brakman et al. 2004). These arguments may thus 
limit the rather pessimistic view on policy actions and effects of changing institutions. 
 
2.1  Decentralization and economic performance 
A large debate on advantages and weaknesses of decentralization and thus their impact on 
economic performance has already taken place in economics and political science
2. The 
following table summarizes shortly the main pro and contra arguments: 
 
                                                 
1   This argument was mainly forwarded in the comments of F. Robert-Nicoud and the authors admit that point 
to a certain degree in their paper. 
2   For a comprehensive survey see e.g. Thießen (2001: 2-8).   4
Table 1:   Arguments supporting and challenging the effects of fiscal decentralization  
Pro Contra 
+  diversification hypothesis: increased 
efficiency due to better information on 
residents’ needs 
+  leviathan restraint hypothesis: 
intense competition between local 
governments reduce the size of 
governments 
+  productivity enhancement hypothesis: 
incentives for political and product 
innovations (“laboratory federalism”) as 
well as a better quality of public 
services due to autonomy and 
accountability of the local government 
+  specialization of functions: efficiency 
gains may arise through specialization 
of representatives dealing with very 
specific activities 
+  high per capita income fixed costs of 
maintaining a decentralized system may 
only be affordable at a higher stage of 
economic development 
+  high degree of urbanization: 
economies of scale are more likely to 
occur at lower government level if the 
population is concentrated 
–  inequities and the need for a 
centralized redistribution policy 
–  macroeconomic stabilization: counter-
cyclical actions and co-ordination of local 
governments are difficult to manage 
–  presence of inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers 
–  exploiting  economies of scale in 
production of public goods and 
administration 
–  quality of governments: central 
governments may attract higher qualified 
people, lobbying and corruption activities 
may be less controlled on the local level 
–  small size of the country/population: 
preferences can be assumed to be rather 
homogenous
3 
–  scarcity of good local taxes meaning 
taxes and fees relying on the benefits 
received principle represent only a minor 
share of total taxes levied 
–  low per capita income level: see Pro 
–  low degree of urbanization: see Pro 
Source: Thießen (2003), OECD (2002), Feld and Dede (2005), own compilation. 
 
Given this range of possible positive and negative effects of fiscal decentralization, empirical 
testing was needed. Empirical studies testing the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
economic performance measured as economic growth, capital formation and total factor 
productivity growth in cross country studies as well as analysis of single countries come to 
very diverse results
4. This fact might be mainly due to different measures of decentralization 
since the commonly used one provided by the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) – 
subnational share of total government expenditure or subnational share of total government 
revenue – does not capture the fiscal autonomy the subnational unit possess to decide about 
expenditure (including different grant schemes) and revenue (taxes, tax bases, fees etc.) (Ebel 
                                                 
3   However, this rule does not seem to be supported by clear real world experience regarding the heterogeneity 
of small countries like Belgium or Switzerland (Stegarescu 2004: 6). 
4   For a recent survey see Feld and Dede (2005: 9-12).   5
and Yilmaz 2002). In order to include these missing aspects, the OECD started to create new 
measures of fiscal decentralization (OECD 1999) for 18 OECD countries. Stegarescu (2004) 
extends this data set to 23 countries and covers the period between 1970 to 2001. Further 
details will be given in the Data section since these data will be used in the empirical analysis. 
 
2.2  Determinants of regional specialization 
The theoretical literature provides very different explanations for the emergence of regional 
specialization. Following traditional trade theory comparative advantages will mainly lead to 
specialization of regions which open their borders. In neoclassical theories political 
institutions are not at all taken into account, regional policy activities would only disturb the 
market forces leading to an equilibrium. “New theories” allowing for imperfect competition 
and economies of scale provide a rich set of possible explanations leading to specialization / 
agglomeration but also to dispersed and multiple equilibria. Especially recent theoretical 
models of the New Econonomic Geography (NEG) in the tradition of Krugman (1991) try to 
analyse the role of public sector interventions in shaping the spatial production structure and 
influencing break and sustain points. Up to now the analysis focuses mainly on the impact of 
policy instruments as taxes and tax competition (Anderson and Forslid 2003, Baldwin and 
Krugman 2004), government spending (Brakman et al. 2002, Brülhart and Trionfetti 2004) 
and specific regional policy measures as infrastructure or subsidies (Baldwin et al. 2003).  
Regarding taxes and tax competition the models demonstrate that in the course of integration 
with an emerging centre-periphery structure, production factors in the core will benefit from 
an agglomeration rent which can be taxed by the region without loosing the mobile 
production factors. Extending this model by government expenditure and thus taking the 
relations of taxes and spending into account, Brakman et al. (2002) can show that increasing 
public spending from a production point of view stimulates agglomeration since the location 
becomes more attractive for production factors operating under economies of scale. 
Moreover, governments are able to change the equilibrium i.e. from agglomerating to 
spreading forces, depending on the relative size, direction or efficiency of public good 
production and distribution. Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004) regard public procurement from 
the demand side and show theoretically and empirically that a region with a large home-
biased public procurement will specialize in that high demanded good produced in a 
monopolistically competitive sector (“pull effect”). The emergence of the so called “spread 
effect” is a second result of home-biased public procurement meaning that due to public 
spending agglomeration forces may be offset. Theoretical results of the impact of public   6
infrastructure investment on the production structure depends on the presence of localized 
spillovers and the policy objectives since here the trade-off between equity and efficiency 
becomes predominant (Baldwin et al. 2003). In their empirical study Combes and Lafourcade 
(2001) confirm the positive relationship of decreasing transportation cost on regional 
specialization and concentration for French regions. 
Empirical studies focussing on policy activities and specialization are very scarce for the time 
being, but there are also only few econometric studies providing insides of the specialization 
process as such. Stirböck (2004) identifies several determinants of regional specialization in 
capital investment and employment coming from different theories as neoclassical trade 
theory, polarisation theory and NEG. Another approach has been chosen by Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Sorensen and Yosha (2003) who focus on the positive impact of risk sharing on specialization 
patterns.  
Theoretical and empirical work on determinants of specialization, especially the role of public 
activities and institutions, is still at the beginning. As far as the author knows there are no 
studies of regional specialization taking the fiscal design of the nation state encompassing the 
regions into account. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
In the following hypotheses for the empirical analysis coming from the theoretical and 
empirical considerations above will be summarized. 
 
(i) Decentralization 
The measures of decentralization capture revenue and expenditure autonomy. Since higher 
specialization is in general related to a higher exposure of economic risk, autonomous regions 
may try to insure against possible shocks by diversifying the local production structure. On 
the other hand, if there is a mechanism of the central government to regulate these risks with a 
redistribution schemes among regions, local levels need not to cover the risk themselves and 
may rather focus on the attraction of specific industries in order to have possible tax revenue 
from agglomeration rents. Another possible explanation for a positive relationship between 
decentralization and specialization may be deducted from the NEG models mentioned above. 
Since local governments would take advantage from greater autonomy to provide specific 
public goods, they may be able to attract mobile production factors which could promote a 
process of agglomeration and intensifying specialization. Following Brakman et al. (2002) 
this may only be possible if the public sector works efficiently. As shown by Baldwin and   7
Krugman (2002) the subnational unit benefits from these developments by levying taxes on 
agglomeration rents. 
 
(ii) New Economic Geography 
The NEG models point to several determinants of location decisions which should be 
considered. Market size, population density and the location of a region seem to be important 
factors – while core regions would rather attract industrial sectors and market services 
(industries with economies of scale), the periphery may specialize in economic activities 
which rely heavily on factor endowments (agricultural territory, touristic services etc.) or 
which have to be provided by the public sector (health, education etc.). The intuition behind 
market size and population density go into the same direction as monopolistically competitive 
sectors prefer the location near large markets with a diversified labour market. Considering 
the last argument from the perspective of mobile workers, they also may want to insure 
against shocks and will chose a location with a diversified production structure. 
 
(iii) Other influencing variables 
In order to capture effects of business cycle, unemployment rates have to be included in the 
empirical analysis since the magnitude of the decentralization measure may also be influenced 
by economic fluctuations. The attractiveness of a region may also depend on research 
activities and thus patents as indicator for research intensity should be taken in. 
 
3. Empirical  analysis 
3.1 Data 
In the following the two important indicators of interest – the specialization and 
decentralization indicators – and their data sources will be described. All other data are 
provided in the appendix. 
In order to analyse the described determinants of specialization we use a panel of 13 EU 
Member States at NUTS2-level (and thus 200 regions)
5. The NUTS2 regions are defined by 
administrative conditions and might not measure economic regions. This problem refers to the 
well known “modifiable area unit problem” MAUP (Brülhart and Traeger, 2004). Figuring 
out economic regions is often an arbitrary task and depends on the analysed variables and 
sectors. Advantage of administrative units is data availability and especially the NUTS2-level 
                                                 
5   NUTS refers to Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS) and is a hierarchical classification of 
regions in a Member State where higher numbers indicate a smaller administrative unit (Eurostat 1999).   8
can be considered when focussing on regional policy implications or on regional structural 
programmes.  
The analysis is based on several data sources. This is first due to the fact that none of the 
possible sources was able to provide a complete data set and consequently several gaps had to 
be filled.
6 However, the starting point was the regional data base (REGIO) of Eurostat
7.  
The basic economic variables for constructing the degree of regional specialization in 
production structure is annual gross value added and employment. As far as possible the data 
set is compiled according to the European System of National Accounts ESA95 including 17 
sectors following NACE Rev. 1
8 including agriculture, manufacturing as well as market and 
non-market services.
9 The rather short time period of investigation (1995-2001) is due to the 
introduction of the new European System of National Accounts (ESA) in 1995 where the 
sectoral disaggregation changed fundamentally.  
As the data for fishing (sector B) is for most regions not separately available, we took the 
aggregate figure for agriculture and fishing (A + B). Consequently, two sub-sectors (A + B as 
well as mining and quarrying (C)) are included for the primary sector. The breakdown into 
branches of the secondary sector is rather limited in ESA95 as only three sub-sectors are 
available (i. e. manufacturing (D), electricity, gas, water supply (E) and construction (F)). On 
the other hand, ESA95 reflects the increased importance of services. The breakdown of the 
tertiary sector into ten branches, (i. e. G to P
10) including retail services, tourism, financial 
intermediation and real estate as well as public services, is now more detailed than it was 
before when the data were based on ESA79.
11 The author is conscious of the limitation of this 
rather broad sectoral breakdown as it can be questioned if the statistical classification is fine 
enough as it might hide heterogeneous developments in specific sub-sectors or cannot show 
economic dependence of some regions on specific sub-sectors. This is the more the case here 
since for example manufacturing is not disaggregated. However, this data set allows for a 
more comprehensive overview of the overall economic activity instead of focussing on 
manufacturing representing on average only 27% of production in the incumbent EU Member 
States contrasting to 70% for services. Moreover, despite their though increasing in fact still 
limited tradability, services are more and more part of international production chains as 
                                                 
6   The regional data set of Cambridge Econometrics offers most of the data that would be needed for this study 
in one set. However, to the author it was not transparent enough how data that is not available at the 
corresponding statistical office was estimated. 
7   For the made adjustments see table A2 in the appendix. 
8   Nomenclature des activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes. 
9    See table A1 in the appendix. 
10  Since no data are available for sector Q (exterritorial organisations) it has been left out of the analysis. 
11  For a list of the NACE sectors see table A1 in the appendix.   9
becomes clear e.g. by foreign direct investment (FDI) data. Services account on a world wide 
scale for 60% of FDI inward stocks as well as two thirds of inward flows (UNCTAD 2004). 
Consequently, to limit an analysis of specialisation to manufacturing as frequently done, 
leaves aside the main part of local and also international economic transactions.  
In relation to employment data, the use of GVA encompasses several advantages: differences in 
labour productivity within and between regions have to be accounted for, employment 
definitions still vary from country to country, flexible employment schemes which become 
increasingly important make comparisons difficult and employment data are compared to GVA 
in a more direct way influenced by public policy as labour protection laws etc. (Aiginger and 
Leitner 2002: 12). However, GVA data have also disadvantages like the need to convert them 
into one currency. Possible misalignments of exchange rates are one major disadvantage of 
operating with GVA data (Brülhart and Traeger 2004: 11).
12  
In empirical literature various indicators are used for analysing sectoral specialisation of 
regions and regional concentration of sectors. All indicators have their advantages and 
shortcomings.
13 In order to obtain results that can easily be compared to other studies and 
compared between each other, one indicator has here been applied that is most commonly 
utilised. Due to the latter, in the following it is not necessary to include an in-depth discussion 
and description.  
Specialisation in relative terms should reveal how much the production structure in one 
region differs from the average of a given set of regions. For this analysis of relative regional 
specialisation the dissimilarity index D has been used. This indicator is one of the most 










For each branch i in a region j the absolute values of the differences of sectoral shares in GVA 
between region j and the average of all regions of the nation state
14 ( j i x ) are added up. In 
contrast to Krugman we divide the result by 2 and multiply it by 100 so the index will take the 
value zero when no specialisation can be observed, i. e. the production structure does not 
differ from the average of all regions included, and it will take the value 100 if full 
specialisation exists.  
                                                 
12  Due to data problems the dissimilarity has only been computed with GVA data. The comparison with 
employment data is left for future research. 
13  For surveys see for example Amiti (1997), Krieger-Boden (1999), WIFO (1999), Bode et al. (2004), Brülhart 
and Traeger (2004), Combes and Overman (2004). 
14   This is the reason why one-region-countries as Luxembourg and Denmark had to be left out in this analysis.   10
The dissimilarity index offers the advantage that it is in comparison to others easily 
interpretable. It also has been applied already in several other empirical studies so that the 
results can be compared to findings of other empirical studies. Moreover, outliers do not 
influence the values as much as it is the case for other indicators. 
 
As already stated in section 2.1., a dataset compiled by Stegarescu (2004) is the basis of the 
decentralization indicators. He distinguishes between tax revenue decentralization and 
revenue decentralization including non-tax revenue
15 (e.g. user fees, capital revenue etc.). 
Following his argumentation, measures of fiscal autonomy has to take into account 
“legislative competencies to determine tax base and tax rate, the attribution of the tax receipts, 
and tax administration”(Stegarescu 2004: 5). The OECD scheme of tax autonomy (OECD 
1999) has been used to provide a classification of taxes (Table 2). While local government has 
total or significant control over its taxes regarding the cases a)-c) and d.1)-d.2) it only has 
very limited or no tax autonomy. 
 










sub-central government (SCG) sets tax rate and tax base  
SCG sets tax rate only 
SCG sets tax base only 
tax sharing arrangements 
SCG determines revenue-split 
revenue-split can only be changed with consent of SCG 
revenue-split fixed in legislation, may unilaterally be changed by central government 
revenue-split determined by central government as part of the annual budget process 
central government sets rate and base of SCG tax. 
Source: OECD (1999: 11). 
 
Three indicators capture three different degrees of tax revenue decentralization adding up the 







Data and indicators are used on a yearly basis and are analysed for the time period 1995 – 2001. 
                                                 
15   Due to data problems, this second measure has been left out of the analysis. 
          SCG a) to c)   
GG total tax revenue  D_tax1 = 
D_tax2 = 
  D_tax3 = 
SCG a) to c) + d.1) to d.2) 
GG total tax revenue 
          SCG a) to e)   
GG total tax revenue   11
3.2 Investigation  approach 
Following the working hypotheses derived in section 2.3 the empirical investigation tries to 
figure out if fiscal decentralization may be one determinant of regional production 
specialization taking into account other possible factors influencing the regional production 
structure.  
The analysis is carried out using generalised least square (GLS) in order to control for 
potential heteroscedasticity. These results will be compared with a pooled cross-section time 
series model and with a country fixed effects model. While pooled regressions exhibit mostly 
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity and thus a bias in the estimators, fixed effects 
models account for all time-invariant unobserved or not-quantifiable country specific factors. 
Herewith the problem of time-constant heterogeneity can be solved. However, difficulties 
with latter techniques arise if time invariant effects play a role
16 or if the assumption of strict 
exogeneity is violated. 
Formally the basic equation takes the following form: 
Dj =   b0 + b1Dtaxj + b2Transfj + b3Efficiencyj + b4RGDPj + b5Densityj + b6PerIndj  
   b7Patentsj + b8Unempj + country dummies + capital dummy + εij 
Dj represents the dissimilarity index D as described above in region j
17. Dtaxj indicate the tax 
decentralization variable in region i. Since changes in institutions (here the federal structure) 
do not lead to an immediate reaction of sectoral change, the variable has been included with a 
three years lead. One has to note that this variable has been computed on a national basis. 
Considering the derived hypotheses it is not ultimately clear in which direction the 
decentralization variable will influence the specialization patterns of a region. In order to 
capture the intranational insuring aspect, the variable Transfj standing for transfers to sub-
national units from other levels of Government (% of total sub-national revenues and grants) 
has been included in the analysis. If this variable shows a positive sign, one could infer that 
these transfers are used as insurance against economic risk rising with production 
specialization.  
As Brakman et al. (2004) demonstrate, the capacity of regions influencing agglomeration 
tendencies hinges on the efficiency of the public sector. Unfortunately there are no efficiency 
indicators available at the regional level thus we use the Bertelsmann Success Index 
(Efficiencyj) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2004) indicating the performance of the national economy.  
                                                 
16   In this analysis the theoretically important impact of the peripherality index has to be taken out with country 
fixed effects models. 
17   As pooled data are used, the time index has been taken out of the specification.    12
Determinants coming from the NEG models are considered in the variables RGDPj, Densityj 
and Perindj. Regional gross domestic product (RGDP) measured as GDP per capita as an 
indicator of demand capacity, population density and the peripherality index representing 
market access of a region can be used a indicators for the attractiveness of a region for mobile 
firms and workers. The same also applies for the regional research intensity captured by the 
variable Patentsj.  
In order to control for business cycle fluctuations, we included the regional unemployment 
rate Unempj.  
Country and capital dummies have been added to the analysis to control for effects on the 
country and capital level. 
The robustness of the results will be checked by using a distinct variable for the efficiency 
indicator - the Bertelsmann Activity Index
18 - and by applying different concepts of 
decentralization. Firstly this can be done by looking at the expenditure side of 
decentralization. Expenditure decentralization (ExpDez) is measured by subnational 
expenditure in percent of total expenditure. As Stegarescu (2004: 7) points out the analysis of 
revenue decentralization may also be broadened by including mostly all sources of public 
revenue and not only taxes such as user charges, operational surplus or capital revenue. Thus 
the variables drev_1, drev_2, drev_3
19 are analysed. 
 
4. Results 
In table 3 first results for the pooled OLS and GLS estimations are presented. The overall 
performance of the estimation is relatively well with explaining 30 and 25 percent 
respectively of changing specialization patterns in this short time period. 
The negative sign of all three decentralization variables show that tax autonomy might be linked 
with decreasing regional specialization although the coefficients of the POLS estimates are not 
significant
20. However, when transfers are considered the insurance function of autonomy 
disappears and regions tend to be more specialized the higher the transfer share is
21.  
The effect of efficiency (Suc) seems to be not very important since the coefficients are very 
low and not significant. Regarding the NEG variables, regional GDP per capita is positively 
related to specialization for both estimation techniques and independently from the 
                                                 
18   This index focuses on factors describing the sources of performance differences between countries. 
19   The three variables represent in descending order the autonomy of regional public revenue building. 
20   This effect is very likely as has already been stated above. 
21   This effect is reversed (but not significantly) in the GLS III where the region has less autonomy on taxes and 
tax bases.   13
autonomous degree of tax revenue. This supports the hypothesis that regions with attractive 
markets might be more specialised and/or might have better insurance possibilities against 
adverse shocks and thus take specialization advantages. While population density seems to 
encourage slightly a specialised production structure, the peripherality index shows that 
regions in the core are rather less specializes relative to peripheral regions. Also regions with 
a higher research intensity seem to be less specialized. The latter effect may be due to the data 
structure, since research intensive sectors are swallowed by the aggregated sector structure. 
The capital dummy variable has the expected positive sign (the capital effect of 
administration), but is surprisingly not significant.  
 
Table  3:    Influence of fiscal variables and regional indicators on specialization 
patterns, Pooled OLS and GLS estimations 





















































































































































































Absolute value of t / z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
                                                 
22  The probability of the Chi²-test gives the joint significance of all coefficients.   14
The estimation results of the fixed effect model shown in table 4 are rather discouraging since 
only 2 to 3 percent of the model can be explained by the used variables. Thus a strong sign 
that further factors should be included in the analysis. However, the interesting coefficients of 
decentralization indicators show significant negative signs emphasizing the possible influence 
of public sector autonomy on production structures. Comparing the coefficients with the 
POLS and GLS results, the signs of the density coefficients have changed but are not 
significant. 
 
Table  4:    Influence of fiscal variables and regional indicators on specialization 
patterns, fixed effect estimations 













































































(1.84)   
16.271 
(7.97)** 
No. of observations  1112  1112  1112 
R²  overall  0.02  0.03   0.03  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Extending the analysis of public revenue decentralisation by including also non-tax revenues 
the results remain quite stable. As is shown in tables A5 – A8 the decentralization variable 
(tax revenue or whole revenue) is mostly significantly negative
23. Considering expenditure 
decentralization, the results suggest a positive relationship between decentralization and 
specialization. Thus, one might infer that if a region has a relatively high expenditure rate 
compared to the national level, it attracts specific sectors resulting in a higher specialised 
                                                 
23   The estimations in POLS VII – IX are an exception but the coefficients are not significant.   15
production structure. The significantly positive sign of the transfer in a further analysis shows 
the possible source of this positive effect – national transfer schemes could provide an 
insurance against adverse shocks and regional expenditure policy might influence location 
decisions of firms. However, one has to be very careful with these proposals since the 
expenditure variable does not reflect the regional autonomy on spending, it only covers the 




Summing up this short empirical exercise on influences of different vertical government 
structures on specialization pattern we could show that the organization of government levels 
has a certain impact on the regional production structure by using a panel of 13 EU Member 
States in the period 1995 – 2001. The results presented so far are very preliminary and should, 
at this stage, regarded with caution. However, it is surprising how well the negative 
relationship between tax decentralization and specialization seems to be. Scope for future 
research will be on several aspects.  
The variable for expenditure decentralization does not capture regional expenditure autonomy 
and should be refined, since this measure could give more insides on the impact of public 
activities on shaping the economic landscape. It would also be interesting to see which sectors 
are mainly attracted by more or less autonomous regions, thus sectoral indicators should be 
included in the analysis. Also the measure of public efficiency lacks generality and can only 
be seen as a rough proxy. It would be very helpful for the analysis to have an index on 
regional government performance. 
The regarded time span is very short for the moment and the small variation in the data could 
be overcome with a longer time period. The new Member States of the European Union 
would be another interesting field of research since production structure and public 
organization have been changing in the last years. Up to now data problems make an in-depth 
analysis difficult. 
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Appendix 
 
Data sources and description 
Gross value added 
- at basic prices 
- Eurostat Database REGIO 
 
Table A1: Sectors included according to NACE Rev. 1 
 Sector 
A_B Agriculture,  hunting, forestry and fishing 
C Mining  and  quarrying 
D Manufacturing 
E  Electricity, gas and water supply 
F Construction 
G  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal 
and household goods 
H  Hotels and restaurants 
I Transport,  storage and communication 
J Financial  intermediation 
K  Real estate, renting and business activities 
L  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
M Education 
N  Health and social work 
O  Other community, social, personal service activities 
P  Private households with employed persons 
   20
Table A2:  Data adjustments 
General 
rules 
•  Due to data problems, some regions had to be excluded or sub-regions to be taken together 
as one region as explained in table A2. 
•  Negative values or zero values have been replaced by a value equal to 1 pro-mille of the 
reported value for the corresponding region.  
•  Missing values in a region in the first or last year were calculated using the corresponding 
growth rate in the next higher regional aggregate for which data was available.  
•  Missing values in the middle of the time span were calculated using linear interpolation. 
•  After all adjustments, new sums were calculated before calculating regional or sectoral shares. 
F, I, J  Breakdown of NUTS1 into NUTS2 according to sector specific regional employment 
shares. Source for employment shares: Bode et al. (2004) 
C, E, G, 
H 
Result of (C + D + E + F) – (D – F) on NUTS 2 level, i.e. (C + E) was split up between 
these two sectors according to the corresponding shares of the single sectors C and E 
on NUTS1 level. Similar approach for G and H. 
D  Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany 
K  Result of (J + K) - J 
Germany 
L, M, 
N, O, P 
Due to a lack of better possibilities (L + M + N + O + P) on NUTS2 level had to be 
split up according to the sectoral shares in those EU15 countries where those data are 
available 
Greece    In 2001 regional breakdown from NUTS1 into NUTS2 according to regional shares in 
2000 of the corresponding sector. 
All 
sectors  
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), United Kingdom. In 2001 regional 




P  Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), United Kingdom. Regional breakdown 
from NUTS1 into NUTS2 according to regional shares in all other sectors in the 
corresponding year. 
 
Regional Gross Domestic Product, Population Density, Patents, Unemployment 
- Eurostat Database REGIO 
 
Peripherality Index 
This measure has been taken from Schürmann and Talaat (2000). This is an index of the potential or 
gravity-model type where market size / potential and distances in terms of accessibility are taken into 
account. High (low) values of the peripherality index indicate a central (peripheral) position of the 
related region. 
 
Decentralization indicators Dtax_1, Dtax_2, Dtax_3, Drev_1, Drev_2, Drev_3 
- for methodology and sources see Stegarescu (2004). 
 
Expenditure Decentralization ExpDez 
- Sub-national Expenditures (% of total expenditures) 
- IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS)   21
- downloadable from the official website of the Worldbank: Decentralization and Subnational 
Regional Economics: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm 
 
Transfers 
- Transfers to sub-national from other levels of Government (% of total sub-national revenues and grants) 
- IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
- downloadable from the official website of the Worldbank: Decentralization and Subnational 
Regional Economics: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm 
 
Efficiency 
- Success Index (Suc) of the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Being the core measure for the International Employment and Growth Ranking of the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung it contains variables of labour market performance and economic growth. Values range from 
0 to 120 with higher values indicating better performance. 
- Activity Index (Act) of the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
This measure focus on 12 indicators of three areas of activity: “labour market, government and 
economy, economy and labour and management” and takes values from 0 to 120 where higher values 
indicate a better performance. 
Both measure are only available on a national basis. 
- for a summary and the methodological background see:  
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/4303_8886.jsp  
 
Table. A3:  Regional disaggregation 
Member State   NUTS-level  No. of Regions  Member State   NUTS-level  No. of Regions 
Austria (AT)  2  9  Italy (IT)
24   2  20 
Belgium (BE)  2  11  Netherlands (NL)  2  12 
Finland (FI)   2  5  Portugal (PT)
25 2  5 
France
26 (FR)  2  22  Spain (ES)
27 2 16 
Germany (DE)
28 2  40  Sweden  (SE)  2  8 
Greece (GR)  2  13  United Kingdom  2  37 
Ireland (IE)  2  2       
 
                                                 
  As data are not yet sufficiently available for ITd1 (Provincia Autonoma Bolzano-Bozen) and ITd2 (Provincia 
Autonoma Trento) separately, we have taken them as 1 region by subtracting ITd3, ITd4 and ITd5 from ITd. 
25   PT20 (Região Autónoma dos Açores) and PT30 (Região Autónoma da Madeira) have been excluded. 
26   Overseas departments have been excluded
. 
27   ES63 (Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta) and ES64 (Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla) as well as ES70 (Canarias) 
have been excluded. 
  The new division of DE40 (Brandenburg) has not been taken into account due to several missing data for the 
subregions.   22
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Table A5: Robustness Tests, tax revenue decentralization, POLS and GLS 





















































































































































































Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
29  The probability of the Chi²-test gives the joint significance of all coefficients.   24
Table A6: Robustness Tests, tax revenue decentralization, fixed effects 
















































































No. of observations  1067  1067  1067 
R²  overall  0.03  0.04   0.05  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table A7: Robustness Test, public revenue decentralization, fixed effects 

















































































No. of observations  1067  1067  1067 
R²  overall  0.03  0.04   0.05  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   25
Table A8: Robustness Tests, public revenue decentralization, POLS and GLS 






















































































































































































                                                 
30  The probability of the Chi²-test gives the joint significance of all coefficients. 